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Summary 
 
We report two studies into psychological factors that have been proposed to 
contribute to the claim of having experienced a precognitive dream. Study 1 
investigated the role of selective recall in precognitive dream experiences. 
Participants read two diaries, one purporting to be a dream diary, and one purporting 
to be a diary of events in the dreamer's life. The events either confirmed or 
disconfirmed the reported dreams. As predicted, a significantly greater number of 
confirmed than disconfirmed dream-event pairs were recalled. Study 1 also 
investigated whether paranormal belief moderated the selective recall effect, but no 
relationship was found. Study 2 tested the hypothesis that paranormal beliefs may in 
part arise from a propensity to associate unrelated events. Participants undertook 
two tasks. For the 'contextual' task, participants were asked to find correspondences 
between randomly-paired news articles and dream reports. The 'neutral' task invited 
participants to produce a noun that would provide an associative connection 
between two unrelated nouns. As predicted, paranormal belief and precognitive 
dream belief were found to correlate significantly with ability to find correspondences 
between dreams and news event pairs. Contrary to prediction, no relationship was 
found between belief and performance on the neutral association task. Together, 
these studies illustrate the operation of mechanisms that, when present in individuals 
having dreams and experiencing subsequent events, would tend to lead to an 
increase in the number of experiences of a seeming coincidence between dreams 
and events that can be interpreted as precognitive. 
 
Keywords: precognitive dreaming; psychological factors 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Precognition – literally fore-knowing – has been described in accounts of prophetic 
dreams from the earliest writings of humankind. Representative surveys show that 
around one quarter of the population believes in the ability to foretell the future 
(Moore, 2005) and about one third report precognitive experiences (Pechey & 
Halligan, 2011). So while these beliefs and experiences concern so-called 
'anomalous' phenomena, their frequency in the general population is actually rather 
common. Case collections indicate that dreams play a particularly important role in 
spontaneous precognitive experiences (Green, 1960; Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 
1886; Rhine, 1954; Van de Castle, 1977).  
Researchers draw a distinction between reports of spontaneous precognitive 
dream experiences and laboratory-based tests of dream precognition. The latter 
allow a controlled test of the hypothesis that a person's dreams can include 
information about a randomly-selected future target that could not have been 
obtained through other sensory or inferential means. The early controlled tests of 
dream precognition, conducted in a sleep laboratory (Krippner, Ullman, & Honorton, 
1971; Krippner, Honorton, & Ullman 1972), obtained moderate to large effect sizes. 
More recent studies, where the participants primarily slept in their own homes, have 
found more mixed results (e.g., Schredl, Götz, & Ehrhardt-Knutsen, 2010; Sherwood 
& Roe, 2003; Watt & Valášek, in press). However the database of controlled 
precognitive dream research is small and the methodologies used have been rather 
variable, so it would be premature to draw conclusions about the evidence for 
precognition from this body of work. 
Controlling for sensory factors and chance coincidence is impracticable with 
spontaneous reports of dream precognition, and efforts to ascertain whether there is 
any genuine anomalous information transfer in these cases have unsurprisingly often 
proven inconclusive. For example, if precognitive dreams contain useful information, 
it might be possible to warn the public of forthcoming disasters or even to prevent 
them from occurring. Following the Aberfan disaster the British Premonitions Bureau 
was set up in London (Barker, 1967) and in the USA the Central Premonitions 
Registry was established (Nelson, 1970). There is little recorded information about 
how these registries fared, but they both faltered apparently in part due to an 
insufficient number of predictions that could be related to specific incidents 
(MacKenzie, 1974). 
Aside from these registries, there has not been a great deal of systematic 
prospective research into the frequency with which spontaneous dreams are later 
confirmed. Besterman (1933) conducted three series in which individuals were asked 
to document their dreams upon awakening and to mail a copy to the researcher. The 
percipient was asked to notify Besterman if they noticed any events occurring that 
corresponded to their dreams. In the first series, it was judged that only two out of 
265 dreams (over an 8-week period) appeared ‘moderately’ precognitive. The 
second series collected 148 dreams, of which only 12 were ‘apparent’ precognitions, 
including two ‘good’ ones. J. W. Dunne served as the percipient in the third series, 
providing only 17 dreams over a four-month period, four of which Besterman felt 
contained ‘fair or moderate’ precognitive material. 
There seems to be a disconnect between the relatively frequent reports of 
spontaneous precognitive dream experiences, which can be powerful and convincing 
for the experient, and the less persuasive results of prospective studies that have 
attempted to document the dream before the confirming events occur. This has led 
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several researchers to suggest that psychological factors may lead to an inflated 
number of precognitive dream experiences. The present studies investigate two of 
these proposed factors: selective recall (study 1), and propensity to find 
correspondences (study 2). 
 
2. Study 1: Selective recall 
 
Our first study looks at whether selective recall could be a factor in leading people to 
conclude they have experienced a precognitive dream. Selective recall in this 
context is defined as a systematic tendency to recall a particular subset of dream-
event pairs.  Thus far the link between memory and extraordinary beliefs and 
experiences has been under-researched (David, Lynn, & Ellis, 2010), though Wilson 
and French (2006) have studied false memory in this context, and have reviewed 
research into cognitive factors and paranormal experiences (French & Wilson, 2007). 
However, little work has been conducted on memory and precognitive dreaming. 
One exception to this is research by Madey & Gilovich (1993; see also Madey, 
1993), who investigated memory for confirming versus disconfirming information as a 
possible explanation for what they term 'folk beliefs' (e.g., it always rains after you 
wash the car) that seem to persist despite disconfirming information. This series of 
studies is particularly relevant to precognitive dreaming because the researchers 
presented participants with prophetic statements (purportedly from a dream diary 
written by an undergraduate student) and with daily event diaries (purportedly from 
the same author) each of which contained one event that either confirmed or 
disconfirmed the prophetic dream. The diaries were constructed so as to resemble 
student life. As an example of a confirming entry, "I had an ominous dream of terrible 
failure" was paired with "I managed to ask this guy that I've been interested in for a 
date and he flatly refused," while the paired disconfirming event was "I received a 
tremendous thrill when I asked this guy that I've been interested in for a date and he 
said yes." Confirming dream-event pairs therefore resemble a precognitive dream 
experience, and disconfirming pairs simulate the experience of a dream that is 
apparently not precognitive. After a short distractor task, participants were asked to 
remember as many dream-event pairs as possible. Madey and Gilovich's studies 
consistently found a recall bias, with participants remembering two or three times as 
more confirmed dream-event pairs than disconfirmed pairs.  
Madey and Gilovich (1993) also investigated the role of paranormal belief in 
selective recall. They hypothesised that believers might be more likely than 
disbelievers to selectively remember confirming dream-event pairs because this 
would be consistent with their beliefs. However, they did not find a significant effect 
of belief, perhaps in part because the majority of participants fell into the 'agnostic' 
category, with only 15% being categorised as believers. Another possible limitation 
was that Madey and Gilovich created their own two-item paranormal belief scale 
(belief in ESP, and belief that dreams are prophetic), which may have been 
unreliable. Madey and Gilovich (1993) described the findings of their paranormal 
belief analyses as "variable and uninformative" (p.461). The present study attempts 
to replicate and extend upon this work by using what we feel may be a more 
informative measure of paranormal belief that will allow comparison with other 
research into the psychology of paranormal belief. Most of the work into the 
psychology of paranormal belief has used Tobacyk's (2004) 7-factor Revised 
Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) (Goulding & Parker, 2001). However, Lange, Irwin, 
and Houran (2000) suggest that this scale suffers from differential item functioning, 
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and instead recommend using a two-factor 'purified' version. Therefore our primary 
measure of paranormal belief is the New Age Philosophy (NAP) sub-scale of Lange 
et al.'s purified RPBS, which contains items about belief in paranormal abilities 
including precognition. As a second, more narrowly-focused measure of belief in 
precognition, we will use the Precognition subscale from the original 7-factor RPBS 
(Tobacyk, 2004).  
 
2.1. Hypotheses 
 
Participants will recall more confirming dream-event pairs than disconfirming pairs, 
and this effect of selective recall will be greater for believer participants compared to 
disbelievers. The study's procedures were approved by the University of Edinburgh's 
ethics committee. 
 
3. Method 
 
3.1. Participants 
 
There were 85 participants (55 female, 30 male, mean age = 23.3 years, SD = 0.66) 
recruited by email. Most (77%) were undergraduate students.  
 
3.2. Materials, tasks and procedure 
Belief questionnaires. The Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS; Tobacyk, 
2004) requires participants to state their level of agreement with 26 items on a 
seven-point Likert-type scale (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). Our analysis 
focused on the NAP sub-scale (11 items; Lange, Irwin, & Houran, 2000), and the 
Precognition subscale (4 items). Three of the Precognition subscale items are 
included in the NAP scale, and one is not ("Some people have an unexplained ability 
to predict the future"). We found good internal consistency for both measures (alpha 
= .89 for NAP, and .83 for the Precognition sub-scale.)  
Diary. Aside from minor changes to adapt the terminology and locations to the 
local context, the diary content was exactly the same as the original created by 
Madey (1993)2. The diary was kept as close to original in content as possible to be 
sure that the confirming and disconfirming events were equally memorable and vivid, 
as established by pilot work described in Madey and Gilovich (1993). There were 10 
entries, with dreams being reported on 8 days. The diary entries about daily events 
contained events typical of an undergraduate's life (e.g., discussions of coursework, 
meals, social events). Each dream was paired with an event that either confirmed or 
disconfirmed the dream content. Of the eight dream prophecies, four were paired 
with confirming events and four with disconfirming events. The order of presentation 
of the dream-event pairs was random. The dream was presented at the beginning of 
each entry, but the confirming or disconfirming target events were embedded 
amongst the text for that day to avoid primacy or recency effects. 
Distractor task. The distractor task was a word association task in which the 
participant is given a letter of the alphabet and says as quickly as they can all the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We are grateful to Richard Madey for generously granting us permission to use and 
adapt his original study materials. 
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words they can think of beginning with that letter. One minute was allowed for each 
letter, and the task duration was five minutes. 
Recall Task. The recall task consists of the following instructions: "You will recall 
that the author of the diary documented her dreams over several days. What we 
would like you to do is try to recall each dream and any event that was relevant to 
the dream. You do not have to recall them in any particular order, but keep the 
particular dream and event together. It is okay if you cannot recall any relevant 
events; however it is important that you try to remember as many dreams as you 
can. Finally be as specific and as detailed as you can when you write down the 
dream and its corresponding event." The recall sheet was made up of the above 
instructions and two empty columns, one headed 'Dreams' and the other 'Events'; 
there were 8 rows for the 8 possible dream-event pairs. 
Procedure. Participants, who were tested individually, first completed 
demographic and belief questionnaires. Next, they were presented with the diary 
with the following instructions: "The following are excerpts from the diary of an 
undergraduate student. The student began writing the diary as a participant of a 
study that looked at the relationship between personality and hand-writing. Please 
read all of the information below and pay equal attention to all parts of the diary. You 
will be asked about what you remember from the diary at the end of the experiment. 
As you'll see from reading the diary, the student reports her dreams and the events 
of the day. We would like you to consider both parts of the diary entry and consider if 
there is any relationship between the two." 
Participants read the diary at their own pace then completed the distractor task, 
after which they read the instructions and completed the recall task in their own time.  
 
3.3. Results 
 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the average response to items in the NAP cluster was 
2.86, while average reported belief in precognition was slightly higher at 3.18. Mean 
scores could range from 1 (low belief) to 7 (high belief) so average scores were just 
below the mid-point of the scale (4 = uncertain). A preliminary inspection of the data 
indicates that the results were as predicted for recall of event type, with participants 
recalling more than twice as many confirming dream-event pairs as disconfirming 
pairs, as shown in the table.  Tables 2 and 3 show, respectively, the descriptive 
statistics for NAP and Precognition belief when participants are split into three equal 
groups according to their scores on these measures. This was done in order to allow 
an initial impression of whether, in relative terms (i.e., for the spread of scores 
obtained with our particular sample of participants), high, medium and low belief 
scores were associated with any differences in mean recall. We use the terms 
'Believer' 'Agnostic' and 'Skeptic' in the table, however this is to avoid the 
cumbersome terminology 'Relative Believer' etc. It can be seen from the tables that 
there is no obvious difference between the belief groups on recall of the different 
event types, contrary to expectation; in all cases more confirming than disconfirming 
pairs are recalled. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N = 85) 
Recall for 
Confirming 
Dream-Event 
Pairs  
(N pairs) 
Recall for 
Disconfirming 
Dream-Event 
Pairs (N pairs) 
New Age 
Philosophy Belief 
Precognition 
Belief 
M = 2.09  
(SD = 1.08) 
M = 0.86  
(SD = 0.89) 
M = 2.86  
(SD = 1.21) 
M = 3.18  
(SD = 1.724) 
 
 
Table 2. NAP belief group and event type 
NAP Belief Group Recall for Confirming 
Dream-Event Pairs  
(N pairs) 
Recall for Disconfirming  
Dream-Event Pairs  
(N pairs) 
Believer1 (N = 28) M = 1.82 (SD = 0.95) M = 0.64 (SD = 0.78) 
Agnostic2 (N = 29) M = 2.34 (SD = 1.08) M = 1.21 (SD = 1.05) 
Disbeliever3 (N = 28) M = 2.11 (SD = 1.17) M = 0.71 (SD = 0.81) 
1Believer M (belief score) = 4.28, SD = 0.58; 2Agnostic M = 2.77, SD = 0.48; 
3Disbeliever M = 1.54, SD = 0.29 
 
 
Table 3. Precognition belief group and event type 
Precognition Belief 
Group 
Recall for Confirming 
Dream-Event Pairs  
(N pairs) 
Recall for Disconfirming  
Dream-Event Pairs (N pairs) 
Believer1 (N = 28) M = 2.07 (SD = 1.05) M = 0.82 (SD = 0.72) 
Agnostic2 (N = 29) M = 2.21 (SD = 1.10) M = 0.86 (SD = 1.01) 
Disbeliever3 (N = 28) M = 2.00 (SD = 1.10) M = 0.89 (SD = 0.94) 
1Believer M (belief score) = 5.11, SD = 0.94; 2Agnostic M = 3.20, SD = 0.68; 
3Disbeliever M = 1.23, SD = 0.38 
 
3.5. Recall of event type, and paranormal belief  
 
Two ANCOVAs were conducted to test the three experimental hypotheses. The first 
looked at event type (within subjects factor: confirming; disconfirming) with NAP 
belief as covariate, and confirmed the expected main effect of event type: F(1,83) = 
16.477, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.17 . However there was no significant effect of the 
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covariate: F(1,83) = 0.123, p = .73. The second ANCOVA looked at event type with 
Precognition belief as covariate. This again confirmed a main effect of event type 
F(1,83) = 18.507, p < .001, partial η2 = 0.18, but found no significant effect of the 
covariate: F(1,83) = 0.027, p = .87. 
Thus, our hypothesis that more confirming than disconfirming dream-event pairs 
would be remembered, was supported. However, our hypothesis that paranormal 
believers would recall more confirming pairs than disbelievers, was not supported. 
 
4. Study 1 discussion 
 
This study attempted to replicate previous work by Madey and Gilovich (1993), and 
to extend upon an "uninformative" aspect of the earlier work by applying a more 
widely used measure of paranormal belief. As predicted, our participants 
demonstrated significantly greater recall of dream-event pairs where the event 
confirmed the dream's prediction compared to pairs where the dream's predictions 
were disconfirmed. These findings replicate the pattern of results reported by Madey 
and Gilovich.  
Madey and Gilovich felt that their investigation of the role of belief in selective 
recall was "uninformative" because only 15% of their participants were categorised 
as believers. Also, they used only a two-item belief scale. Madey and Gilovich do not 
provide the data to allow a more exact comparison, but as we were able to 
categorise one third of our participants as believers (mean scores above the mid-
point of the scale), we feel we have been able to conduct a more informative 
investigation of this question. Contrary to prediction (but again consistent with Madey 
and Gilovich's findings) we found no evidence that this effect was stronger for those 
who believed in paranormal ability or specifically in precognition. Rather, the 
increased recall of confirming dream-event pairs, relative to disconfirming dream-
event pairs, was consistently found across all groups of participants: believers, 
agnostics, and disbelievers. This suggests that the selective recall of confirming 
dream-event pairs is a pervasive cognitive bias that affects individuals irrespective of 
their beliefs.  
Our first study has found evidence in support of the idea that selective recall is 
one psychological factor that can lead to an increased frequency of reported 
precognitive dream experiences, because dreams that are not confirmed are less 
likely to be remembered. Our second study turns attention to another psychological 
factor that has been proposed to contribute to an increased frequency of paranormal 
experiences: propensity to see correspondences. 
 
5. Study 2: Propensity to find correspondences 
 
Mednick (1962) defined the creative thinking process as "the forming of associative 
elements into new combinations which either meet specified requirements or are in 
some way useful" (p. 221), and Krippner (1963) suggested an association between 
psychic experiences and the creative personality. Several researchers have 
observed a connection between a propensity to link unrelated events, and 
paranormal beliefs and experiences (e.g., Brugger, 1997; Brugger & Graves, 1997). 
Mohr et al. (2001) asked participants to judge the semantic distance between 
unrelated words that had been randomly paired. It was found that participants 
reporting greater Magical Ideation (MI: Eckblad & Chapman, 1983) judged unrelated 
words as more closely associated than participants reporting lower MI. They 
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suggested that this propensity to see associations was an important aspect of 
creative thinking and schizotypy as well as being integral to the formation of 
paranormal beliefs. Gianotti et al. (2001) replicated these findings by looking at how 
associative processing differed in paranormal believers and non-believers using a 
new measure called the Bridge-the-Associative-Gap (BAG) task. Participants had to 
make word associations to link pairs of words that were either indirectly related or 
unrelated to each other. Word responses were then split into 3 groups - Unique 
associations, Rare associations, and Common associations. Magical Ideation was 
used as an index of paranormal belief. Overall, paranormal believers made 
significantly more Rare associations between the unrelated word pairs than 
disbelievers, which led the authors to conclude that believers in the paranormal are 
more creative and are therefore more likely to make associations or connections 
between two unrelated items. Similar findings were obtained by Duchêne, Graves 
and Brugger (1998). However, both these studies found no significant difference 
between the number of Unique associations made by believers and disbelievers. 
Gianotti et al. (2001) note that this may have been due to the experimenters' inability 
to differentiate between creative unique word associations and associations that are 
completely personal to the participant. 
The association tasks used in the studies reviewed above have been rather 
abstract or 'neutral' in context, and so far none of this research has been explicitly 
linked to the experience of precognitive dreams. Our Study 2 therefore considered 
whether the general relationship that has been reported between paranormal beliefs 
and propensity to find correspondences in a neutral task would also be found 
specifically with a task designed to more closely match the context of precognitive 
dream experience.  
As with Study 1, we used two indicators of belief. The first is the broad measure of 
NAP belief from the RPBS. Study 1 also had a four-item scale of belief in 
precognition. However, in order to have a more focused measure of precognitive 
dream belief that included personal experience of precognitive dreaming, and that 
gave a well-specified definition of precognitive dreaming based on Bender's (1966) 
criteria, a new three-item scale was devised, as described below.   
We also used two measures of the propensity to see correspondences, one 
'neutral' and one 'contextual'. The neutral measure was the BAG task, whose validity 
we attempted to improve by asking participants to avoid producing any associations 
that are personal to them. Our contextual task provided participants with extracts 
from a dream diary that had been randomly paired with world news events, and 
asked them to find connections between the pairs. 
 
5.1 Hypotheses 
 
Participants who report greater levels of belief in paranormal ability and precognitive 
dreaming will find greater numbers of correspondences on the neutral and contextual 
association tasks than participants reporting lower levels of belief. The study's 
procedures were approved by the University of Edinburgh's ethics committee. 
 
6. Method 
 
6.1. Participants 
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Fifty undergraduate participants (27 female, 23 male) from the University of 
Edinburgh took part in the study. All were proficient English speakers and none had 
any reading difficulties. All were aged between 18-24 years. 
 
6.2. Materials, tasks, and procedure 
 
Demographic questions. Participants were asked to indicate their gender and age, 
with the latter in four categories: under 18, 18-24, 25-32, over 32 years. 
Neutral association task. The Bridge-the-Associative-Gap (BAG) task (Gianotti et 
al., 2001) was used as a neutral measure of associative creativity. It consisted of 40 
pairs of nouns, half of which were semantically indirectly related to each other (e.g., 
leg-shoe) and half of which were semantically unrelated to each other (e.g., corn-
helmet). Word pairs were presented at 5-second intervals on a computer screen. 
Participants were told to read aloud both of the words that appeared on screen and 
to then say a noun that they semantically associated with both of them. In line with 
Gianotti et al. (2001) participants were told to try to avoid the use of proper nouns 
and non-nouns, and that if they couldn't think of a word to say nothing. The present 
study also asked participants to try and avoid personal associations. Participants' 
associative responses were noted by the experimenter. Associations that were 
produced after the 5-second interval were not recorded. 
To score the BAG task, in line with Gianotti et al. (2001), words were split into 3 
groups depending on the frequency with which they were produced amongst the 
whole sample of participants, for both indirectly related and unrelated word pairs. 
These groups were unique, rare and common associations, and the number of each 
was tallied for each participant. A unique association was a word that was produced 
once out of all of the participants' responses to a particular word pair. Two to three 
indirectly related associations were classified as rare, and four or more indirectly 
related associations were classified as common. For unrelated associations, two 
were classified as rare, and three or more were classified as common. As with 
Gianotti et al. (2001) the measure of interest is the number of unique and rare 
associations made between Unrelated word pairs. 
Contextual association task. This was a novel method that we created to 
determine the propensity to connect unrelated events in the context of dream 
precognition. The task consisted of 40 items, half of which were short news articles 
from the BBC website from 2000/2001, and half of which were dream diary entries 
submitted to the website www.dreambank.net3. Articles and diary entries were 
between 50 and 200 words in length and were screened for potentially distressing 
content. None of the news articles had any direct connection to the dream diary 
entries. Each of the twenty news articles and diary entries were numbered from 1 to 
20 and were randomly paired for each trial with the use of an online random number 
generator. This ensured that participants were given two unrelated events for each 
trial. 
Participants were given four sets of news article and dream diary pairs. They were 
given three minutes to read each pair and then write down as many connections and 
similarities as they could find between them. Participants were told that if they 
couldn't find any connections to notify the experimenter, who would then give them 
the next pair.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The world news events were selected from 10 years ago so that they came before the dreambank reports, so it could not be 
suggested that there was a pre-existing precognitive connection between the dreams and events. 
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To score the contextual association task, both experimenters independently 
counted the number of connections each participant made. The experimenters then 
had to agree on the overall score for each participant. A greater number of 
connections made suggested a higher propensity to make connections between 
unrelated events. 
Belief questionnaires. To measure belief in paranormal abilities, the NAP subscale 
of the RPBS was used. Scores on this 11-item subscale could range from 0 to 66, 
and in Study 2 we again found good internal consistency for this measure: alpha = 
84. To measure belief and experience in precognitive dreaming, a three-item scale 
was devised. The first question (from Schredl, 2004) asked 'how often have you 
recalled your dreams recently (in the past several months)?' This item was chosen 
because in order to have a precognitive dream experience one first has to be able to 
remember one's dreams. A person who remembers their dreams readily will be more 
likely to experience a coincidental life event than a person who cannot remember 
their dreams, and research does indeed find a correlation between dream recall and 
frequency of precognitive dreaming (Schredl, 2009). Response options were 'almost 
every morning,' 'several times a week,' 'about once a week,' 'two or three times a 
month,' 'about once a month,' 'less than once a month,' or 'never'. Scores could 
range from 0 for 'never' to 6 for 'almost every morning.' The second question asked 
'do you believe that some individuals have dreams that predict future events and are 
not just coincidence?' The three response options were 'yes' 'unsure' and 'no', which 
scored from 2 to 0 points. The third question listed the 5 criteria, as outlined by 
Bender (1966) which defined whether a dream that has come true is evidential of a 
precognitive dream, before asking 'based on the five criteria above, please indicate 
approximately how often you have had a precognitive dream over the last few years.' 
The six response options were 'about once a day,' 'about once a week,' about once a 
month,' 'about once in 6 months,' 'about once a year,' or 'never'. Scores could range 
from 5 to 0. Total scores for the precognitive dream questions could therefore range 
from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 134. 
Procedure. Participants, who were tested individually, first answered the 
demographic questions and then completed the BAG task followed by the dream and 
event diary task. Finally, they completed the RPBS and the belief in precognitive 
dreams questionnaire. 
 
6.3. Results 
 
6.4. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Paranormal belief. The mean NAP belief score was relatively low at 18.56 (SD = 
11.12), well below the middle of the possible range of scoring (0 - 66). In contrast, 
mean belief in precognitive dreaming seemed to be stronger at 5.32 (SD = 2.33), 
closer to the midpoint of the possible range of scoring (0 - 13). 
Neutral association task. Proper nouns and non-nouns were removed from the 
data set. Synonyms were treated as one word (e.g. 'love' and 'adoration') as they 
were semantically the same. Table 4 shows the data for the number of unique, rare 
and common associations produced for indirectly related and unrelated word pairs 
on the BAG task.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Alpha is not reported for this second measure due to the different response options. 
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Contextual association task. The mean number of associations reported between 
dreams and news events for each participant was 11.1 (SD =  2.33). 
 
 
Table 4. Mean and SD of the number of unique, rare and common associations 
produced on the BAG task for both indirectly related and unrelated word pairs (N = 
50). 
 
Word pairs Association Mean SD 
Indirectly 
related 
Unique 4.42 2.95 
 Rare 2.84 1.58 
 Common 10.88 3.62 
    
Unrelated Unique 5.46 2.62 
 Rare 2.06 1.27 
 Common 7.74 3.10 
 
 
6.5. Paranormal belief and propensity to find correspondences 
 
Contrary to expectation, belief in paranormal ability (NAP) was not correlated with 
the number of unique or rare associations made between the Unrelated word pairs 
on the neutral association (BAG) task, respectively: r(48) = -.08, n.s.; r(48) = -.02, 
n.s.). No relationship was found between belief in precognitive dreaming and number 
of unique or rare associations made between the Unrelated word pairs on the neutral 
association (BAG) task, respectively: r(48) = .06, n.s.; r(48) = -.15, n.s.. There was 
therefore no support for the hypothesis that paranormal belief would be associated 
with a greater propensity to find correspondences in the neutral association task. 
As predicted, there was a significant positive correlation between NAP belief and 
performance on the contextual association task: r(48) = .33, p = .01 (1-t). A 
significant positive correlation was also found between belief in precognitive 
dreaming and performance on the contextual association task: r(48) = .34, p = .008 
(1-t). Therefore our hypothesis that paranormal belief would be associated with a 
greater propensity to find correspondences on the contextual association task was 
supported. 
 
7. Study 2 discussion 
 
Study 2 tested the suggestion that propensity to find correspondences would be 
related to belief in paranormal ability and belief in precognitive dreaming. Two 
associative tasks were used, one neutral and one contextual. The neutral BAG task 
measured the number of unique or rare associations made by participants to pairs of 
unrelated words. Previously, Gianotti et al. (2001), using the Magical Ideation Scale 
as an index of belief, had reported that paranormal believers produced more rare 
(but not more unique) associations to unrelated word pairs than disbelievers. Gianotti 
et al. had suggested that scoring of their BAG task was complicated by participants 
possibly giving personal associations, and our study attempted to overcome this 
problem by asking participants to avoid giving personal associations. However, the 
present study, using a different measure of belief, did not replicate Gianotti et al.'s 
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(2001) results. One reason for this lack of replication may be that our participants' 
scores on the belief measures suggested that they held mainly low to moderate 
levels of belief in paranormal ability and precognitive dreaming. In contrast, Gianotti 
et al. selected participants from the upper and lower quartiles of paranormal belief 
scores, so their analysis was conducted with two distinct groups.  
Any comparison between studies may be complicated by the possibility that the 
BAG task itself is not a particularly sensitive indicator of associative ability. We found 
it to be difficult to code the words as unique, rare or common, despite following 
Gianotti et al.'s (2001) criteria. For example, we chose to code pairs of synonyms as 
the same word because they were semantically related. Gianotti et al. don't give 
criteria for how synonyms should be coded. Also, we found it difficult to separate 
idiosyncratic responses from truly creative ones. This might be the case when a 
unique association was not semantically related but was given due to a personal 
association. These difficulties might be overcome in future with the development of 
stricter criteria for what counts as a valid association, or perhaps by using multiple 
coders. 
However, we did find the predicted significant relationship between paranormal 
belief, belief in precognitive dreaming, and performance on our contextual 
association task. This provides evidence in support of the suggestion that propensity 
to find correspondences may lead to increased frequency of experience of seemingly 
precognitive dreams. 
 
8. General discussion 
 
We have described two studies testing the proposition that the frequency of 
experience of seemingly precognitive dreams may be increased through the 
operation of certain cognitive processes. We also investigated whether those 
reporting higher levels of paranormal belief, as measured broadly by the NAP sub-
scale of the RPBS, and more narrowly by measures of belief in precognition, would 
more strongly show the hypothesised propensities. 
Study 1 looked at memory processes. It found that, when presented with a dream 
diary paired with a diary of subsequent life events some of which appeared to 
confirm or disconfirm the dreams' predictions, participants had a strong propensity to 
recall the confirming dream-event pairs but to forget the disconfirming pairs. 
Participants remembered more than twice as many confirming dream-event pairs, a 
bias that in real-world situations would be likely to lead to an increased frequency of 
the subjective experience of a dream being confirmed by subsequent events.  
We interpret these results in terms of cognitive processes that lead to memory 
consolidation: when an event appears to confirm a dream, this would be more salient 
than a disconfirming event. The salient dream-event pairing would therefore receive 
more processing and be more easily recalled as a result. In comparison, a dream 
that is not confirmed by subsequent events is perceived as a non-event amongst a 
large number of possible non-events. These non-events are not noticeable, do not 
receive much attention, and are therefore less likely to be remembered. Madey and 
Gilovich (1993) report evidence in support of this interpretation, as they found that 
participants spent more time scrutinizing confirming dream-event pairs than 
disconfirming pairs. However like Madey and Gilovich (1993), we did not find any 
evidence that this memory bias was greater for paranormal believers, suggesting it is 
a powerful and pervasive cognitive bias. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN PRECOGNITIVE DREAM EXPERIENCES 14 
Our second study investigated the suggestion that paranormal belief and 
experience may occur when certain individuals have a particular ability to find 
correspondences between unrelated events. Researchers (e.g., Bressan, 2002; 
Brugger et al., 1993) have suggested that if an individual subjectively experiences a 
large number of coincidences then this may lead to them developing paranormal 
beliefs. We presented participants with two measures of associative ability: a neutral 
word-association task, and a contextual task in which participants were asked to 
report correspondences between randomly-paired dream diary entries and world 
news events. Neither of our paranormal belief measures correlated with neutral task 
performance, a result that may in part indicate that the BAG task is an unreliable 
indicator of associative ability given that we did find the predicted significant 
relationship between paranormal belief and contextual task performance. We 
suggest ways in which the reliability of the BAG task may be increased. The 
contextual task was designed to resemble real-world precognitive dream 
experiences, and it appears to be a useful measure with which researchers might 
further explore the psychology of precognitive dream experiences. While our task is 
presented in the guise of pairs of dreams and subsequent events, it could readily be 
adapted to simulate other kinds of coincidences that resemble psychic experiences, 
for instance between one person's thoughts and another's.  
The psychological literature tends to focus on the implications of paranormal belief 
(e.g., Russell & Jones, 1980), and there is a need for more research into disbelief, 
which tends to be assumed to equate simply to an absence of belief. We suggest 
that any cognitive bias associated with 'belief' could potentially cut both ways. Just 
as a paranormal believer may be inclined to notice associations that are consistent 
with their beliefs, it is also possible that someone who holds a disbelief in the 
paranormal may fail to notice associations that are inconsistent with their belief. In 
this case, the disbeliever may underestimate the frequency with which their dreams 
appear to be confirmed by subsequent events. This is a question that merits further 
investigation, and whose ramifications of course extend beyond precognitive 
dreaming to cognitive biases and scientifically unsubstantiated beliefs more 
generally. 
While a propensity to perceive associations can be pathologically linked to 
schizophrenic thought disorder, now understood as a disinhibition of the spreading 
activation in semantic networks (e.g., Spitzer, Braun, Hermle, & Maier, 1993), such 
tendencies can also be found in quite "normal" individuals who score high in Magical 
Ideation. Our own study participants, an unselected "normal" student sample, did not 
report particularly high levels of paranormal belief. Nevertheless belief correlated 
moderately and significantly with performance on the contextual association task. 
Mohr et al. (2001) caution against tarring paranormal belief with negative 
connotations, noting that loosening of associative processes is also positively and 
adaptively associated with creativity. Rather, they recommend that future research 
should strive to understand the distinctions between pathological disinhibition of 
associations, non-pathological paranormal beliefs and experiences, and creative 
styles of reasoning.  
The studies reported here highlight two possible mechanisms that would lead 
individuals to experience an increased frequency of precognitive dream experiences: 
selective recall and propensity to find correspondences. Logically, finding evidence 
in support of these postulated psychological mechanisms does not rule out the 
possibility of genuinely paranormal connections between dreams and subsequent 
events, and the present studies do not address the question of the evidentiality of 
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precognitive dreams. However, our studies may help to explain the discrepancy 
between the limited findings of prospective spontaneous precognitive dream studies 
and the rather frequently reported experience of having dreamed about a seemingly 
unpredictable future event.  
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